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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
BRADFORD DALE GETTLING, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20080037-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
& •k & & 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(3)(b). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in denying Gettling's motion to suppress evidence 
obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure. This issue presents a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 15, 103 P.3d 699. This issue 
was preserved in a motion to suppress (R. 42-35). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of all relevant statutory and constitutional provisions is set forth in the 
Addenda. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Bradford Gettling appeals from the judgment and sentence of the Honorable James 
R. Taylor, Fourth District Court, after the denial of his motion to suppress and his 
conviction of possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, by a Sery guilty 
plea. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Bradford Dale Gettling was charged by criminal information filed on January 9, 
2006 in Fourth District Court with possession or use a controlled substance in a drug free 
zone, a second degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a 
Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and 58-
37a-5a respectively (R. 04-03). Bail was set at $10,000 cash on January 3, 2006 (R. 02-
01). On January 9, the Court appointed counsel for Gettling, advised Gettling of the 
charges and penalties, and set a waiver hearing for January 1L 2006 (R. 11-09). 
On January 11, the Court reset bail at $5,000 and at the request of counsel, set a 
preliminary hearing for February 15, 2006 (R. 19-17). On January 23, 2006, Gettling 
posted bail and signed a promise to appear at the preliminary hearing on February 15 (R. 
21-20). At the preliminary hearing, the Court found probable cause and the charges were 
bound over for trial (R. 24-22). The entry of plea was scheduled for March 15, 2006 (R. 
22). On March 15, the Court granted a continuance at the request of defense counsel, and 
the entry of plea was rescheduled for April 5, 2006 (R. 28-26). On April 5, defense 
counsel requested time to file a motion, and the matter was continued to April 26, 2006 
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(R. 31-29), at which time, the Court gave defense counsel two weeks to file a motion to 
suppress, and scheduled oral arguments for June 7, 2006, (R. 34-32). The parties later 
stipulated to a continuance to July 5, 2006 (R. 46-44). 
Defense counsel filed the motion to suppress with its supporting memorandum on 
May 24, 2006 (R. 42-35). Counsel argued that the Level 2 detention of Gettling was not 
supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and that the evidence against 
Gettling seized as a result of the encounter should therefore be suppressed (R. 41-36). In 
its response, filed June 30, 2006, the State argued that Gettling did not have standing to 
contest the search of the vehicle, and even if he did, the search of the vehicle was incident 
to the arrest of the driver (R. 54-50). The State also argued that Gettling's detention was 
only a Level 1 encounter because a traffic stop's Level 2 status only applies to the driver, 
and not the passengers (R. 50-48). Defense counsel's reply, filed July 13, 2006, argued 
that Gettling asserted his standing by arguing that his personal belongings were 
unlawfully searched (R. 68-67). Counsel also argued that Gettling was detained, and not 
free to leave, thus making his detention a Level 2 encounter (R. 64-63). 
On July 5, defense counsel requested a continuance, and it was granted, with oral 
arguments on the motion to suppress rescheduled for August 2, 2006 (R. 59-57). The 
arguments were moved to August 9, on which day, the matter was set for further 
proceeding on September 6, 2006 (R. 71-69). 
On September 5, 2006, the Court denied Gettling's motion to suppress, holding 
that, although Gettling had standing to challenge the search of his glasses case, he had no 
standing to challenge the canine search of the vehicle (R. 75) The Court also held that 
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Gettling's furtive movements, coupled with the canine's interest m Gettling's glasses 
case that remained in the car after Gettling exited, provided the officer with probable 
cause to search Gettling's glasses case (R. 74). 
On October 9, 2007, Gettling waived his right to a jury trial, and pled guilty to a 
third degree felony, possession of a controlled substance, for which the State agreed to 
drop the misdemeanor paraphernalia charge (R. 175-73). The guilty plea was a Sery plea 
that allows Gettling to appeal the Court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence 
against him (R. 197: 6). Sentencing was then scheduled for December 6, 2007 (R. 174). 
Gettling was given a suspended sentence of up to five years in prison, placed on 
probation for 36 months, and ordered to pay $9,275 fine, plus surcharge and interest (R. 
179-76). 
On January 7, 2008, a Notice of Appeal was filed with the Court (R. 193-92). The 
Utah Court of Appeals subsequently certified this matter to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Preliminary Hearing: February 15, 2006 
On January 2, 2005, Deputy Shawn Radmall stopped a vehicle after observing the 
vehicle making lane violations (R. 194: 5-6). Gettling was seated directly behind the 
driver, Steven Canals (R. 194: 6). After arresting Canals for outstanding warrants and a 
suspended license, and placing Canals in the cruiser, Radmall informed the other 
occupants of the vehicle that he was going to run his dog around the vehicle (R. 194: 6-7, 
12). At that point, Radmall "noticed a little bit of furtive movement from" Gettling, (R. 
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194: 7), but had not located any drugs or suspected any of the vehicle's occupants of 
using drugs, (R. 194: 12). Radmall later testified that he witnessed Gettling "doing 
something along the seat," and that "his arms were down and he was leaning over 
towards the passenger side" (R. 194:21-22). Radmall testified that he was concerned that 
"there may be a weapon or something in the vehicle" (R. 194: 24). Because Radmall 
noticed Gettling "doing some kind of movement" in the back seat, Radmall asked 
Gettling and the other passenger, Amber Childs, to exit the vehicle and stand with the 
female UVSC officer backmg him up (R. 194: 7, 14, 26). At that point, Radmall said, 
Gettling and Childs were not free to leave, and that he would have kept them there had 
they tried to leave (R. 194: 14, 17). 
After removing Gettling and Childs from the vehicle, Radmall ran his dog around 
it (R. 194: 7, 13). The dog indicated in two areas: the top of the driver's window and the 
door handle of the back passenger side door (R. 194: 7). At that point, Radmall told the 
front passenger of the vehicle—who also owned the vehicle—that he was going to put the 
dog in the car (R. 194: 7). The owner consented, noting that there should not be anything 
in the car (R. 194: 8). The dog indicated under some luggage in the back seat, at which 
point Radmall moved the luggage and found a glasses case containing methamphetamine 
in a small plastic baggy and paraphernalia inside of it (R. 194: 8-9). The substance tested 
positive for methamphetamine at the State Crime Lab (R. 194: 9). 
Canals and Childs both indicated that the glasses case did not belong to them, and 
Gettling only said, "Don't make me tell you. Don't make me say it." (R. 194: 10). 
Gettling indicated that the luggage belonged to him, but only by asking to remove some 
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items from it (R. 194: 10, 19). Radmall arrested Gettling and did not read him his 
Miranda rights (R. 194: 18). Radmall said the stop occurred withrn 1,000 feet of UVSC 
(R. 194: 11). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the denial of Gettling's motion to suppress and vacate 
his conditional guilty plea because the evidence against him was obtained through an 
unreasonable search and seizure of his personal property. 
Gettling was unreasonably seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
because he was detained and not free to leave, even before probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity on Gettling's part arose. Gettling was detained as a result of 
his furtive movements, made in the back seat of the car after the driver of the car had 
been arrested on outstanding warrants and a suspended license. However, this Court has 
held that mere furtive movements do not give rise to reasonable suspicion that a crime 
has been committed. Furthermore, Gettling's detention was an unlawful extension of the 
scope of the initial traffic stop, which was fulfilled and completed once the driver who 
committed the traffic offense had been arrested. Accordingly, all evidence discovered 
after that unlawful detention must be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. GETTLING WAS ILLEGALLY DETAINED, AND THE 
SUBSEQUENT SEARCH OF HIS PERSONAL PROPERTY 
WAS ILLEGAL 
The trial court erred in denying Gettling's motion to suppress because 
Gettling was illegally detained and his personal belongings improperly searched in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This Court 
has outlined "three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters between law 
enforcement officers and the public: 
"(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the 'detention must be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop1; (3) an officer may arrest 
a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been 
committed or is being committed." 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (citations omitted). 
A. Police lacked the required reasonable suspicion to escalate the 
encounter with Gettling to a level two encounter. 
In this case, Gettling, the driver and other passenger were lawfully seized 
pursuant to a legal traffic stop, specifically the vehicle in which he was riding was 
pulled over for traffic violations and the driver was subsequently arrested on 
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outstanding warrants (R. 194: 6). However, while the initial seizure of the passengers 
pursuant to the stop of the driver is a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, the 
purpose of the stop is limited and any detention must be brief and related to the scope 
of the stop. See Brendhn v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2403 (2007); see also State v. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ffif 28,29, 63 P.3d 650; and State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 
(Utah 1994) (a detention incident to a traffic stop must be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop and scope of the stop must be 
"strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation 
permissible"). Any further detention must be supported by at least reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. See State v. James, 2000 UT 80, If 10, 13 P.3d 576; see also 
State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, If 15, 107 P.3d 706. 
Accordingly, if the officers in this case had reasonable suspicion that Gettling or 
the others were engaged in additional criminal activity, then further detention would 
have been justified. However, any such investigation and detention "must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary" to effectuate the purpose of the 
investigation. See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. In addition, if the police officers reasonably 
believe that the passengers are armed and dangerous, additional steps, such as 
conducting a Terry fiisk, may be reasonable. See State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ^ 13, 78 
P.3d 590. However, such detentions to fiisk for weapons are "'a serious intrusion upon 
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the sanctity of the person' and should not be taken lightly. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 17(1968)). 
In State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650, police pulled over a driver for 
traffic violations, but, without suspecting any further illegal activity, questioned the 
driver about the presence of drugs, alcohol or weapons in the vehicle, and asked to search 
the vehicle. Id. at \ 32. This Court held that it was reasonable under the circumstances for 
the driver to believe that he was not free to leave. Id. at If 45. 
Here, Deputy Radmall testified that he had no reason to believe that either the 
driver or anyone else in the vehicle was using drugs; nor did he have suspicion at this 
point of any other criminal activity (R. 194: 12). Thus, Gettling should have been free to 
leave. However, before running his dog around the vehicle, Radmall had Gettling get out 
of the vehicle and stay with another officer who was backing up Radmall, and Radmall 
never told Gettling he was free to leave (R. 194: 13-14). Radmall also testified that, 
although he had not told Gettling he had to stay, he "considered he was detained" (R. 
194: 17). 
Just like Hansen, when Gettling was asked to exit the vehicle and stand in the 
"threatening presence" of another officer, it would have been unreasonable for him to 
believe he was free to leave. In fact, Radmall testified that he "probably" would have 
kept Gettling there if he tried to walk away (R. 194: 17). Clearly, Gettling was detained 
and not free to leave before any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity arose. 
The trial court denied Gettling's motion to suppress because, in its view, the dog's 
indication on Gettling's personal property, coupled with Gettling's furtive movements, 
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gave Radmall "the requisite probable cause to search the glasses case" (R. 74). However, 
the "requisite probable cause" found by the trial court clearly did not arise until after 
Gettling was detained, before the dog sniffed around the outside vehicle (R. 194: 7. 13). 
Police had no reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain Gettling m the first place. 
Absent other incriminating circumstances, the furtive movements cited by Radmall as the 
reason for removing Gettling from the car do not give rise to reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity. State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132, 1137 (Utah 1989). Radmall should 
have allowed Gettling to leave with all of his possessions, rather than detain him prior to 
the free air canine sniff of the vehicle because the purpose of the stop was to investigate 
the driver, and nothing further pointed to Gettling being engaged in criminal activity. 
B. Gettling7s furtive movements do not give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity, thereby making Gettling's 
detention an illegal seizure. 
Gettling's furtive movements in the back of the vehicle do not create a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing, thus negating police's stated reason for removing 
Gettling from the car and detaining him. The Court has previously held that "[m]ere 
furtive gestures of an occupant of an automobile do not give rise to an articulable 
suspicion suggesting criminal activity." Schlosser, 11A P.2d at 1137. 
In Schlosser, police observed "a passenger in the vehicle, bending forward, acting 
fidgety, turning to the left and to the right, and turning back to look at the officer." Id. at 
1133. The Court held that, without more, the passenger's movements did not "show a 
reasonable possibility that criminal conduct had occurred or was about to occur." Id. at 
1138. This Court said that the passenger 
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may have been attempting to locate a driver's license. He could have been 
preparing for conversation with the officer by turning down the volume on 
the radio or extinguishing a cigarette. He may also have been putting away 
food and beverages, changing a baby's diaper, putting on the parking brake 
or doing a host of other innocuous things. When confronted with a traffic 
stop, it is not uncommon for drivers and passengers alike to be nervous and 
excited and to turn to look at an approaching police officer. 
Id. 
Radmall testified that after he had arrested the driver and told Gettling and the 
other passenger that he was going to run his dog around the vehicle, he "noticed a little 
bit of furtive movement from . . . Gettling" (R. 194: 7). He said that Gettling's "arms 
were down and he was leaning over towards the passenger side (R. 194: 22). Like 
Schlosser, Gettling could have been doing a "host of other innocuous things" when he 
leaned over toward the passenger side of the vehicle. Radmall testified that it was "due to 
the furtive movement" that he had Gettling get out of the vehicle and stand with the other 
officer on scene (R. 194: 22). Thus, Gettling was detained and not free to leave, merely 
because of his furtive movements in the vehicle—furtive movements that by law do not 
"give rise to an articulable suspicion suggesting criminal activity." Because a person 
cannot be detained without that reasonable or articulable suspicion of criminal activity, 
Hansen, 63 P.3d at 661, Gettling's detention was an unreasonable and illegal seizure, and 
the trial court erred in failing to rule that he was unlawfully detained. 
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The scope of the traffic stop was fulfilled and its purpose concluded once the 
driver of the vehicle in which Gettling was riding was arrested. Accordingly, Gettling's 
continued detention was an improper and unreasonable extension of the scope of the 
initial traffic stop because police never had a reasonable suspicion that Gettling had or 
was about to commit a crime, before or during the traffic stop. Therefore, all evidence 
obtained as a result of this illegal detention and search should be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant respectfully requests this court to reverse 
the denial of his motion to suppress and vacate his conditional Sery plea, and remand this 
case to the Fourth District Court for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of November, 2008. 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 24th day of November, 
2008. 
MargarefP. Lindsay / j ^ 
Counsel for Appellam 
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FILED 
Fourth Juftea&i Dis'ici Court 
of Ui&ii w^>irty, ST£.£t of Utah 
„ , ^^Cy^wgrdeputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRADFORD DALE GETTLING, 
Defendant. 
RULING & ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 061400084 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court 
having carefully considered and reviewed the file in this matter, the memoranda submitted by tlie 
parties, having heard oral arguments, reviewed the submitted memoranda, and good cause 
appearing therefore, the Court enters the following Ruling. 
FINDINGS OF FACT & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. On January 2,2006, Deputy Shawn Radmall of tlie Utah County Sheriffs OfBce was on 
patrol on Geneva Road in Provo when he observed a vehicle crossing left of center. The 
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Officer suspected a possible DU1 and followed the vehicle along Geneva Road into Orem 
and onto 1300 South. 
2. Deputy Radmall observed several violations before performing a traffic stop. The driver 
of the vehicle was a Mr. Steven Canals. The officer observed two passengers in tire car. 
The passenger in the front passenger seat, Amber Childs ("Miss Childs"), was the owner 
of the vehicle. The passenger seated directly behind the driver was the Defendant, 
Bradford Dale Gettling (£CMr. Gettling"). 
3. Deputy Radmall ran a license and warrant check on the driver. After discovering that the 
driver had outstanding warrants and a suspended license, Deputy Radmall arrested Mr. 
Canals. 
4. Deputy Radmall then questioned the two passengers of the stopped vehicle to determine 
if either had a valid driver license. Both responded that they did not. 
5. Deputy Radmall informed the passengers that he was going to perform a canine search of 
the vehicle incident to the driver's arrest. According to the officer, the backseat 
passenger, Mr. Gettling appeared to be nervous at this statement. 
6. As Deputy Radmall placed the driver in the deputy's police vehicle, he observed what he 
believed were furtive movements by Mr. Gettling in the backseat of the stopped vehicle. 
Deputy Radmall informed Mr. Gettling and Ms. Childs that he intended to run his dog 
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around the vehicle in order to perform a free air search of the vehicle. Ms. Childs 
advised him that she was fine wife the exterior search of the vehicle. Deputy Radmall 
asked Mr. Gettling and Ms. Childs to exit the vehicle while he performed a canine search 
of tlie exterior of the vehicle. After performing a brief Terry Frisk, he asked them to 
stand by a backup officer from Utah Valley State College ("UVSC"). Deputy Radmall 
subjectively believed, but did not express his belief to the two passengers that they were 
not free to leave. 
8. During the canine search, Deputy Radmall's canine indicated positive for the presence of 
narcotics in the vehicle on the passenger's side rear door handle. 
9. Deputy Radmall iiifonned the front seat passenger and owner of the car, Amber Childs of 
the dog's positive indications. Ms. Childs agreed to his request that the dog search the 
interior of the vehicle. Ms. Childs stated that she did not believe that any drugs were in 
her car. 
10. Once inside die car, tlie dog indicated positive for the presence of narcotics somewhere 
in the backseat of the car. Deputy Radmall removed luggage from die backseat to expose 
a hard glasses case that was underneath the luggage. Upon opening the case, Deputy 
Radmall discovered drug paraphernalia (a spoon, some straws, a glass pipe) and 
methamphetamine inside. 
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11. Deputy Radmall informed the three occupants of the vehicle of his findings. Ms. Childs 
and Mr. Canals both denied owning the drugs and related paraphernalia. 
12. After Ms. Childs' denied ownership, Mr. Gettling looked at Deputy Radmall, nodded his 
head and said: "Don't make me tell you. Don't make me say i t " 
13. Mr. Gettling requested that Deputy Radmall retrieve several items from the luggage and 
give them to Ms. Childs. Mr. Gettling advised the officer that he was transient and "that 
was all of his stuff." 
14. Mr. Gettling filed his Motion to Suppress on May 24, 2006. 
15. The State filed its Response on June 30,2006. 
16. The Defendant filed his Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress on July 
13, 2006. 
17. The Court heard arguments on the matter on August 9,2006. 
II 
ANALYSIS & RULING 
The issues before the Court are: (1) does a passenger in a vehicle have standing to assert 
a claim that his Fourth Amendment riglit against search and seizure has been violated; (2) if a 
passenger does have standing, is he unlawfully detained during the search; and (3) will evidence 
discovered during the search be suppressed. The Defendant asks the Court to suppress the 
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evidence of Methamphetamines and Drug Paraphernalia on the basis that Deputy Radmall 
unlawfully extended the scope of the Defendant's detention. Specifically, the Defendant argues 
that Deputy Radmall had completed his traffic stop, arrested the driver of the vehicle on a 
warrants check, returned to the vehicle without suspicion of criminal activity, and asked 
Defendant, a passenger in the vehicle, to exit the vehicle while Deputy Radmall improperly ran a 
canine unit around the vehicle. The Defendant argues that any evidence obtained from the 
canine search is a result of an illegal detention of Defendant and should be suppressed. 
A. Standing 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. 
CONST. AMEND. IV. Before asserting a violation of Fourth Amendment rights, a 
defendant must first establish that he has standing in item of place searched. State v. 
Bisseger, 16 P.3d 178, 181 (Utah Ct. App. 2003)(overruled on other grounds). It is 
important to note that the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment "are personal in 
nature and may not be vicariously asserted." Rakas v. Illinois. 439 U.S. 128,133-34 
(1978); Bisseger, 76 P.3d at 181; State v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1006 (1993). A defendant 
challenging the validity of a search must establish that he possessed a reasonable 
"legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded space." Bisseger, 76 P.3d at 181 
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(internal citations omitted). A defendant bears the burden of proving his standing. Scott, 
860P.2datl007. 
In determining whether a defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
area and belongings searched, the Court employs a two-part test. Bisseger. 76 P.3d at 
181. First, the defendant must show that he had "a subjective expectation of privacy in 
the searched area." Id.; State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah Ct App. 1992); 
Scott, 860 P.2d at 1007. Next, the Court must "determine whether the defendant's 
expectation was objectively reasonable . . . [and] whether society is willing to recognize 
the individual's expectation of privacy as legitimate." Id. (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). Generally, a passenger in the vehicle does not having standing to 
assert a Fourth Amendment claim unless the passenger has an ownership interest in the 
vehicle. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-49; Bisseger, 76 P.3d at 181-82. Scott. 860 P.2d at 
1007. A passenger, however, who has an ownership interest in personal property seized 
from the car, such as a closed item similar to a purse or luggage, may have standing in 
that individual item. See Bisseger, 76 P.3d at 182. 
In Bisseger, the driver consented to the search of the vehicle. 76 P.3d at 180. 
The officer asked the passenger, who had no ownership interest in the vehicle, to get out 
of the car. Id. She did so, but left some of her personal belongings in the car mcluding a 
small opaque lip-balm container. Id. As the officer searched the car, he discovered the 
6 
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lip-balm container. Id. at 180-81. The officer knew that the container belonged to the 
passenger and had no individualized probable cause as to tlie container. Id. 
Nevertheless, the officer opened the container without first obtaining permission from Hie 
passenger and found methamphetamine inside. Id. In reviewing the passenger's motion 
to suppress, the Court of Appeals analogized the lip-balm container to a purse, shoulder 
bag, jacket, or shopping bag and determined that such items are "closed containers] that 
keep[] the owner's personal things hidden from public view" and u[b]ecause [the 
defendant] placed private things in a closed opaque container, [the defendant] had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of the container." Id. at 182. Therefore, 
while passengers in a vehicle do not have standing to object to a search of the vehicle 
itself, the passengers will have standing to challenge the search and seizure of their 
personal property found within the vehicle. Id. A passenger will not have standing if it 
can be shown that they abandoned the property. State v. Rvnhart 125 P.3d 938 (Utah 
2005). 
Applying Bisseger to the instant case, tlie Court finds that the Defendant has 
standing as to the search of tlie hard glasses case found as a result of the canine search of 
Hie vehicle. The officer discovered the glasses case underneath luggage on the backseat 
of the vehicle next to where the Defendant was sitting. Officer Radmall opened the case 
and searched it prior to determining ownership of the case. Similar to the lip-balm 
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container found in Bisseger, the glasses case was a personal container, it was closed and 
opaque. At the point of discovery, the officer could not ascertain who owned the glasses 
case and made no attempt to determine ownership prior to opening it. This Court finds 
that similar to a purse Jacket, or lip-balm, a glasses case is a personal item in which a 
person would have a legitimate expectation of privacy. 
Although die Defendant has standing as to contest the search of the glasses case, 
the Defendant does not have standing as to the canine searches of the vehicle. The 
Defendant did not have or claim any ownership interest in the vehicle. Without any such 
interest, the Defendant has no standing to contest the vehicle's search. Further, the 
search was valid as incident to the arrest of the driver and the permission the officer 
obtained from the other passenger, Amber Childs, who was also the owner of the vehicle. 
B. Search & Seizure 
As standing has been established, the Court now analyzes the claims forwarded 
by Defendant in his Motion to Suppress. The Defendant asserts that evidence obtained in 
the search of the glasses case should be suppressed because (1) the vehicle he was a 
passenger in was unlawfully searched, (2) the officer improperly required Defendant to 
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vacate the vehicle, and (3) that the subsequent detainment of the Defendant was 
unlawfully extended due to the unlawful search of the vehicle. 
As noted above, the Court has found that Defendant does not have standing to 
contest the search of the vehicle. Therefore, any argument that evidence should be 
suppressed because of an unlawful search of the vehicle is inapplicable to the instant 
case. Consequently, because the search of the vehicle is not in question, any evidence 
obtained as a result of the vehicle's search will not be suppressed unless there are other 
independent grounds requiring their suppression. 
As to the search of the glasses case, the Court finds that Deputy Radmall had the 
requisite probable cause to search the glasses case. When a canine search is performed, a 
positive indication by a drug-sniffing canine provides the requisite probable cause to 
search a container. State v. Mavcock, 947 P.2d 695 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Deputy 
Radmall's canine clearly indicated on the glasses case. This indication, along with the 
Deputy's previous observations of Defendant's furtive actions when the Defendant was 
still in the backseat of the car, provided the Deputy with the requisite probable cause to 
search the glasses case. 
A claim of an unlawfully extended detainment of the Defendant, a passenger, has 
no bearing on the lawfulness of the search of the car and the subsequent search of the 
glasses case. In State v. Shepard. the Utah Court of Appeals pointed out that "[t]he 
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ORDER 
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth therein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. 
Signed this ^ 
£DINfc 
day of September, 2006. 
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